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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF 
lJ'l1AH, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
EZRA C. LUNDAHL, INC., E. COR-
DELL LUNDAHL, SHRYLEEN B. 
LUNDAHL, EZRA C. LUNDAHL and 
LEA'l1HA A. LUNDAHL, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Civil 
No. 
11359 
Plaintiff-Respondent petitions the above-entitled 
Court pursuant to Rule 76( e) (1), U. R. C. P., for a re-
hearing in the above entitled matter on the decision of 
this Court filed May 20, 1969, upon the following points 
wherein it is alleged that the Court has erred: 
POINT I: The Supreme Court in basing its de-
cision holding the bank had lost its right to charge back 
on Section 70A-4-212(1) and the jury finding that the 
bank was negligent, failed to consider and pass on the 
effect of Section 70A-4-21.2( 4) that the bank's right to 
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charge back is not affected by failure of the bank to 
exercise ordinary care, and the official comment there-
to that irrespective of the cause of the non-payment 
and of the person ultimately liable for non-payment. 
charge back is pennitted, even where non-payment re-
sults from the bank's negligence, the remedy being in 
damages. 
POINT II: The Supreme Court in passing on the 
fullness of the accord and satisfaction misconstrued 
Lundahl' s position and testimony, holding that it in-
cluded "the obligatiMi in controversy," when actually 
Lundahl maintained throughout the trial and in their 
brief to this Court (page 5 of Appellant's Brief) that 
the fact that the $8,100.00 check was unpaid was not 
known by the Lundahls, and the settled law appears to 
be that an accord and satisfaction can cover only items 
on wh1'ch there is a meeting of the minds. 
STATEMEN'l' OF THFJ NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a Petition for rehearing filed by Plaintiff-
respon<lent on a decision of the Supreme Court filed 
May 20, 1969. 
DISPOSITION IN PRIOR DECISION 
In its May 20, 1969 decision, the Supreme Court 
reversed the judgment of the lower court in Plaintiff's 
favor an<l affirmed the judgment of the lower court 
in Defendant 'R favor. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks a rehearing on the de-
cision of .May 20, 1%9, and an ultimate affirmance of 
tliP lower court's judgment. 
STATE~fE~NT OF FACTS 
No restatement ot' the facts is necessary, except to 
point up again that the Lundahls maintained in their 
testimony during trial and in their brief on appeal that 
they were not aware that the $8,100.00 check (the one 
in eontroversy) had 110t Leen paid until sometime in 
F'ehruary, 19G7, which was about six weeks after the 
accord and satisfaction on January 4, 1967, which the 
Supreme Court held in its decision settled and compro-
mised ''all accounts'' between Lundahl and the Bank. 
STA1'I<JMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I: The Suvreme Court, in basing its de-
cision holding the bank had lost its right to charge back 
on Section 70A-4-2L2(1) and the jury finding that the 
bank was negligent, failed to consider and pass on the 
effect of Section 70A-4-2L2( 4) that the bank's right to 
d1ar_r;e back is not affected by failure of the bank to e.r-
ercise ordinary care, and the official comment thereto 
that irrespective of the cause of the non-payment and 
of tlie verson ultimately liable for non-payment, charge 
back is permitted, even where non-payment results from 
tl1t' bank's negligence, tlie remedy being in damages. 
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POINT lI: The Supreme Cou,rt in passing on the 
fullness of the accord and satisfaction misconstrued 
Lundahl's position and testimony, holding that it in-
cluded "the obligation in controversy," when actually 
Lundahl maintained throughout the trial and in their 
brief to this Court (page 5 of Appellant's Brief) that 
the fact that the $8,100.00 check was unpaid was not 
known by the Lundahls, and the settled law appears 
to be that an accord and satisfaction can cover only 
items on which there is a meeting of the minds. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Supreme Court, in basing its decision holding 
the bank had lost its right to charge back on Section 
70A-4-2L2(1) and the jury finding that the bank was 
negligent, failed to consider and pass on the effect of 
Section 70A-4-212(4) that the bank's right to charge 
back is not affected by failure of the bank to exercise 
ordinary care, and the official comment thereto that 
Irrespective of the cause of the non-payment and of the 
person 'ultimately liable for non-payment, charge back 
is permitted, even where non-payment results from the 
bank's negligence, the remedy being in damages. 
Thjs Court, in holding that the bank had lost its 
right to charge haek the Lundahl account and was at 
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~uid time no longer an agent for its depositor, Lundahl, 
~tnted: 
"However, this (the agency) presupposes that the 
hank acts in accordance with its duty imposed by 
law: and thi8 requires presentation to the payor 
bank in the due course of business, and if the check 
is dishonored, notice to its depositor by its midnight 
deadline or within a longer reasonable time under 
tlie circumstances. Sec. 70A-4-212(1), U. C. A., 1953. 
If tht>re is a substantial failure of the bank to per-
form this duty, it loses its right of charge-back. 
See. 70A-4-212, U. C. A., 1953. 
r:rhis Court then recites the jury finding that the 
bank was negligent in failing to give notice. 
Petitioner asserts that this Court has done some 
8elective application of a portion of Section 70A-4-212, 
resulting in an unwarranted exclusion of other equally 
important portions of said Section. 
rrhis Court singles out and applies subsection (1) 
of 70A-4-212. It apparently has inadvertently failed to 
consider, or if considered, for some reason failed to 
comment nn, sub8ection ( 4) which plainly states: 
"The right to charge back is not affected by 
(a) Prior use of the credit given for the item; or 
(h) Failure of the bank to exercise ordinary care 
with respect to the item, but any bank so failing 
remains liable.'' 
This seems to state unequivocably that negligence 
does not prevent or preclude charge-back, nor cause the 
hank to lose its right to charge back. 
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The question then anses, what does the bank re-
main liable for? 
This is answered m the comments to the Section 
from the 1962 official text of the National ConferencP 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws: 
Comment 5: "The rule of subsection ( 4) relating 
to c1iarge-back (as distinguished from claim for 
refund) applies irrespective of the cause of the non-
payment, and of the person ultimately liable for non-
payment. Thus, charge-back is permitted even where 
non-payment results from the depositary bank's own 
nPrrli gence. 
Any other rule would result in litigation based ' 
upon a claim for wrongful dishonor of other checks 
of the customer, with potential damages far in ex-
ces8 of the amount of the item. Any other rule 
would require a bank to determine difficult ques-
tions of fact. The customer's protection is found 
in ~he general obligation of good faith (Sections 
1-203 and 4-103). ff bad faith is established the 
customer's recovery "includes other damages, if 
am, suffered by the party as a proximate conse-
quence." (Section 4-103 (5) ; see also Section 4-402). '' 
Section 4-103(5) cited above, (which is 70A-4-103 
(fl) U. r. A. 19[)3) provides for the computation of dam-
ages against a party who has failed to use ordinarv 
care in hanclling an item. 
This suhse(•tion provides: 
( 5) The measure of damages for failure to exer-
cise onhnan- care in handling an item is the amount 
of the it01~1 · rNlnced b~- an amount which could not 
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have been realized by the use of ordinary care, and 
where there is had faith it includes other damages, 
if any, suffered by the party as a proximate con-
sequence. 
The question o t' the amount of damages to Lundahl 
was suhmitted to the jury by the lower court, along 
with the question of due care, in question Number 3, 
as follows: 
''If you make a finding in answer to the previous 
question, then here consider the question of damage 
and award the Defendant such damage, if any you 
find, as vvas proximately caused by the Plaintiff's 
om1ssion, if anv you find." 
Thf' jury ans·wcred: 
"\Ve, the jury, find the amount of $893.93 which 
was taken by the bank from the account of Lundahl.:;;, 
Inc to be awarded to the Defendants.'' 
It is the bank's position that the bank, as Plaintiff, 
specific~lly, and the banking industry, as an important 
element of our society, in general, is entitled to have a 
full interpretation of the applicable portions of the new 
commercial code given them by this Court. 
Of paramount importance is the question as to whe 
ther subsection (1) of 70A-4-212 is exclusively applic-
able, or whether or not subsection ( 4) has some applic-
abilit~v, and if not, why not, and if so, to what extent. 
If subsection ( 4) is of equal dignity with subsec-
tion (1), then the Lundahls remedy is in damages under 
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Section 70A-4-103(5). The Jury found these damage, 
to he $893.93. 
rnrns. if as Suhsection ( 4) clearly says, the bank\ 
failure to exercise ordinary care does not affect its right 
to charge-back the item, bnt leaves it liable for damages, 
the banh was entitled to charge-hack the item of $8,100.00 
and respond in damages for its failure to exercise ord-
inary care, in the sum of $893.93, as fixed by the jury. 
rr1his is exactly what the lower court did. 
Petitioner calls the Court's attention to the portion 
of its di:>cision which states: 
'' R:1t when a party has demanded a trial by jury 
he is entitled to have the jury find the facts, and 
it is not the trial court's prerogative to make find-
ings inconsistent therewith and thereby defeat the 
effect of the jury's findings.'' 
Pe6tioner respectfully submits that this rule should 
apply to all of the jury's findings, including the finding 
on the amount of damages suffered by Lundahls, be-
cause the effect of this Court's decision in selectively 
applyinf only subsection (1) of 70A-4-212 to this case 
and sidestPpping- subsection ( 4) thereof, is to make a 
finding that Lundahl suffered damages of $8,100.00 by 
the bank's failure to exercise ordinary care, whereas the 
jury found these damages to he only $893.93. 
Petitioner fortlier points out that this Court's de-
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mswn emphatically pointed up the jury's findings of 
net','liger1te and on accord and satisfaction, questions 1, 
2 aud 4 and the am;wers thereto, all being favorable to 
Lundahl, hut did not in any respect even mention 
question 3 and its answer, which was not favorable to 
Lundahl. rrhe inviolate position afforded by this Court 
with respect to three of the jury's answers should also 
be afforded to the answer to question three, and it is 
respectfully suggested that this Court should not ig-
nore it nor modify it. 
The Uniform Commercial Code is now in the same 
position as was the Uniform Negotiable Instrument law 
about a half century ago. Court interpretations of the 
law are_ in Petitioner's opinion, not only of vital im-
portancP to the specific litigants involved, but to the 
commercial world in general. Petitioner thinks that 
attorneys. bankers, educators, judges and businessmen 
everywhere are interested in cases, wherever decided, 
interpreting the code. These interpretations over the 
years certainly will be of benefit as guides for future 
conduct of business and in commercial transactions in-
volving the code. These benefits, it would seem, warrant 
a close scrutiny of the language of the code and a de-
termination of its applicability. 
Specifically, if Subsection ( 4) of 70A-4-212 does 
not mean what it says and should not be read in con-
junction with the other provisions of 212, Petitioner 
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asserts that reat'on should be given for such isolation. 
And, if Subsection ( 4) is applicable, and the dE~­
positor 's remedy is in damage:-; for the bank's fai]mp 
to use urdinary care, then Petitioner claims the benefit 
of it, and since the ;jnr.\· has spoken on the amount of 
damage involved, this amount should be accepted bi· 
this court and not modified. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
Tlu; Supreme Court in passing on the fullness of 
the accord and satisfaction niisconstrued Lundal1l's 
position and testimony, holding that it included "the 
obligation in controversy," when actually Lundahl main-
tained throughout the trial and in their brief to this 
Court (page 5 of Appellant's Brief) that the fact that 
the $8,100.no check was unpaid u1as not known by the 
Liindahls, and tlie settled law appears to be that an 
accord and satisfaction can cover only items on which 
tliere is a meeti11_q of the minds. 
This Court apparently construed Lundahl 's posi-
tion and testimony to be that the accord and satisfac-
tion of .J annal',\' 4, 1967, included the obligation in con-
troversy. 
Actuall,\·, if Petitioner reads the Lundahl testimony 
(Tr. 105) and contention made in their Appellant's 
Brief, page ;), rorrectly it is their position that they 
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did not know the item involved was unpaid at the time 
of the accord and satisfaction. 
If Lundahl 's testimony and contention is accepted 
by this Court, that they were unaware of the outstand-
ing item at the time of the January 4, 1967 accord and 
:satisfaction, and if this Court holds to its decision that 
the accord and satisfaction covered the ''unknown'' item, 
the law in £Ttah would appear to be that an accord and 
satisfaction requires no meeting of the minds on the 
suhject matter, but is more in the nature of a release 
of all claims, known or unknown. 
This certainly would be contrary to established law 
on the subject. 
The accord in an :i,greement. Fairchild vs. Mathews, 
(Idaho. 1966) 415 P ( 2d) 43. 
The general essentials of accord are set forth in 1 
Am. Jur. (2d), Accord and Satisfaction Section 4, page 
:304 as follows: 
The discharge of claims by way of accord and satis-
faction is dependent upon a contract express or im-
plied; there can be no accord and satisfaction with-
out making of a new contract, one independent of 
and additional to the source, contractual or other-
wise, of the disputed claim or claims. The essen-
tials to a valid contract generally must be present. 
It must appear that there is a proper subject matter, 
that the parties thereto were competent to con-
tract with each other, that there was consent or a 
met=>ting of the minds of the parties, and that the 
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agreement was supported by a sufficient consid-
eration. A claim is not discharged if the purporter! 
accord and satisfaction violates the law. 
Without belaboring the point, it is most difficult 
to understand how an accord can cover an unknown 
item. 
CONCLUSION 
Pe6tioner respectfully asks this Court to grant a 
rehearing in this matter, and upon such rehearing, 
affirm the judgment of the trial court, or in the altern-
ative, if this Court feels that the case as now presented 
is cluttered up with too many extraneous facts, to grant 
a new trial with limitations or instructions as to the 
scope thereof. 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
By-------------------------------·-··-----------------··-··· 
Charles P. Olson 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
BY---------------------------------------------------------· 
Don B. Allen 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
